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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appeal from the jury verdict, appeal from district court sitting in appellate capacity. 
B. Procedural History 
Appellant Wade Tomlinson, (hereafter "Tomlinson"), was charged with driving 
under the influence, (hereafter "DUI"), in Citation# 1481950, entered a plea of"not guilty", 
and the matter was set for jury trial. The jury trial was continued at Tomlinson's request on 
two occasions. The state filed a MOTION IN LIMINE with the clerk of the court on March 
4, 2013. The state did not request a hearing at the time said motion was filed. The state did 
not ever file a request for hearing on the MOTION INN LIMINE. A TRIAL STATUS 
MEMORANDUM was filed on November 19, 2012, ordering the state to prepare a formal 
complaint for trial by "1 week prior". The formal complaint was filed on April 17, 2013- the 
morning of the jury trial. The jury trial was held, at which time the jury returned a verdict of 
"guilty". Tomlinson was sentenced, and a timely appeal was filed. The state filed a 
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MOTION TO DISMISS appeal, defendant filed an OBJECTION, at which time the 
state withdrew their MOTION TO DISMISS. The district court sitting in an appellate 
capacity denied the appeal. appeal and brief in support follows. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Boise City Police Officer David Frederick, (hereafter "Frederick"), seized 
Tomlinson's vehicle at 10:45 PM, (Jury Trial transcript, (hereafter "Tr", p 77, 11 7-8), for 
committing two infractions- touching the double yellow line while exiting from a parking 
lot, and not utilizing the closest available lane when making a left hand turn. Tomlinson 
performed the field sobriety tests, and was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving 
under the influence. Tomlinson submitted two breath samples, (breath alcohol 
concentration, hereafter "BAC"), at forty-four and forty-six minutes after the time of the 
stop, (Tr p 78, 11 1-7). Tomlinson had not been driving for approximately forty-five minutes 
prior to submitting the two samples, (Tr p 78, 11 7-10). At the time of the seizure, (when 
Tomlinson was last driving at 10:45 PM), he was traveling to his residence in Meridian, 
Idaho, approximately ten miles from the location of the seizure, (Tr p 123, 111-2, see also 
Defendant's A, p 124, 114). The driving time from the location of the seizure to 
Tomlinson's residence is about 15-20 minutes, (Tr p 122, 1122-25). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should Tomlinson' s request for a continuance been granted at the time 
the state filed the formal COMPLAINT on the morning of jury trial? 
2. Was Tomlinson denied due process oflaw by the Court's erroneous 
rulings in matters of law and evidence? 
III. ARGUMENT 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL 2 of 13 
A. Tomlinson's request for a continuance should have been granted at the time the state 
filed the formal COMPLAINT on the morning of jury trial. 
Tomlinson was charged under 18-8004 by citation. The morning of jury trial, the 
state filed a formal complaint that could be interpreted as an attempt to proceed "per se", 
with the language stating, " ... with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, as shown by 
analysis of blood, urine, or breath, ... ". Prior to jury trial, the state filed a MOTION IN 
LIMINE requesting the following ruling from the Court, " ... and hereby moves this Court to 
exclude any evidence or testimony, whether elicited by a defense of State witness, regarding 
the measurement of the uncertainty or margin of error for the LifeLoc FC20 device or 
regarding the rising of the Defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC)." The state's motion in 
lirnine did not specifically request to exclude field sobriety tests or other evidence 
concerning impairment. There was no written ORDER by the Court on the motion in 
lirnine, the Judge made some rulings on the motion on the morning of and during the jury 
trial. The state listed two issues specifically in the motion in limine- margin of error and 
rising of blood alcohol content. 
Tomlinson is entitled to notice as to evidence allowed and not allowed. Notice in 
this context means actual rulings by the Court, not notice that the state would attempt to 
unconstitutionally limit Tomlinson's right and ability to present evidence by means of 
proceeding "per se". Tomlinson was precluded from presenting evidence through cross-
examination about FSTs, BAC at the time of the seizure, and other issues of impairment not 
listed in the state's motion in limine. Since there was no written order from the Court 
addressing the state's specific requests in the motion, the Court went beyond the request in 
the motion in limine and denied Tomlinson due process by excluding evidence of time 
frames and impairment. 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 45( c) addresses the filing of a notice for hearing: 
Rule 45. Time 
(c) For motion, affidavits. A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, 
and notice of hearing thereof, shall be served not later than seven (7) days before the time specified for the 
hearing unless a different period of time is fixed by rule or by order of the court. For cause shown such an 
order may be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion and opposing affidavits must be served not less than one (1) day before the hearing 
unless the court permits them to be served at a later time. 
Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 3( d) allows the state to amend a pleading prior to the 
state resting if the defendant is not prejudiced. In this case, Tomlinson was prejudiced by 
the amendment the morning of trial. Tomlinson prepared for trial based on the citation 
issued the night of the incident. The state did not actually file the COMPLAINT until the 
morning of trial. Tomlinson did not have sufficient notice of the hearing on the morning of 
trial. A MOTION IN LIMINE is defined as follows: 
"What counsel refers to as a motion to suppress may be more properly 
denominated, in this case, a motion in limine. While no statute or rule expressly 
authorizes such a motion, this Court has recognized its existence and stated that it 
"enables a judge to rule on evidence without first exposing it to the jury .... The court's 
ruling on the motion enables counsel on both sides to make strategic decisions before trial 
concerning the content and order of evidence to be presented." Davidson v. Beco 
Corporation, 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 P .2d 781. 784 (Ct.App.1986). modified on other 
grounds." 
The dispositive language here is, "The court's ruling on the motion enables 
counsel on both sides to make strategic decisions before trial...", ( emphasis added). 
MCR 3(d) allows for a continuance in the Court's discretion. The state could and should 
have noticed the Motion before the morning of jury trial, and filed the Complaint in a 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL 4 of 13 
timely manner. 1 Tomlinson asked for a continuance, arguing," ... Judge, I may be 
heard then. We would argue we're entitled to notice on these motions. As far as the 
Complaint that was just filed, we just received that. We've prepared for trial and 
proceeded on the fact that is (sic) says DUI on the citation, which is all we were provided 
with.", (Davidson, (supra), cited during the argument). "So Judge, we're going to object 
to this being heard. We were not placed on proper notice of this Complaint, and we were 
not placed on proper notice of this Motion in Limine, and the jury is on the way in. So if 
the Court is going to hear this Motion in Limine, we're going to request a continuance." 
The Court denied the request for continuance and proceeded to hearing/trial. 
Tomlinson prepared for trial and was on notice that the charge was impairment 
DUI up to and including the morning of trial. Unless and until the Court granted the 
Motion in Limine, per se DUI was not an issue. A defendant should not have to guess or 
speculate when preparing a defense for jury trial- and when preparing to argue a Motion 
in Limine. An expert witness to testify for the defense concerning ascending/descending 
BAC, absorption rates of alcohol, FSTs, et al, would cost a significant amount of money. 
Unless/until the Motion in Limine is granted, a defendant should not have to spend 
money on an expert witness. The case law is clear; the Court violated due process2 by 
hearing the Motion at all, and abused its discretion by not granting the requested 
continuance. 
1 Though not conceding an expert witness is necessary, had Tomlinson been afforded 
proper notice that the state would be allowed to proceed on the per se theory, an expert 
would have been utilized. 
2 "Due process requires an opportunity upon reasonable notice for a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal.", Miller v St Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr. 139 Idaho 825 (2004). 
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Tomlinson reiterates and incorporates by reference all arguments in Issue 2 in 
support of Issue 1 since evidentiary rulings by the Magistrate are applicable to both. 
B. Tomlinson denied due process oflaw by the Court's erroneous rulings in matters oflaw 
and evidence. 
Tomlinson reiterates and incorporates by reference all arguments in Issue 1 in 
support of Issue 2 since evidentiary rulings by the Magistrate are applicable to both. 
The state argued, and the Court erroneously ruled that State v. Stutliff, 97 Idaho 
523, 547 P.2d 1128 (Idaho 1976), stood for the proposition that Tomlinson was precluded 
from presenting any evidence of margin of error on the LifeLoc, ascending descending 
BAC, results of field sobriety tests, i.e., any evidence of impairment, (.Tr p 101, 116-25, p 
102, 111-25, p 103, 111-22). The Court in this case utilized Stutliff and held that the state 
did not have to extrapolate the BAC back to the time of the stop, (when the defendant 
was last driving), and any evidence goes to weight instead of admissibility, (Tr p 102, 11 
9-14). Evidence that goes to weight versus admissibility is relevant evidence, and 
Tomlinson should have been able to present said evidence under the Court's own ruling.3 
The Court and the state misinterpreted and misapplied Stutliff. In that case, the district 
ruled that the BAC was inadmissible because the state did not have a witness to 
extrapolate the level back to the time of the stop: 
"We hold that this statute does not require extrapolation back but establishes that 
the percentage of blood alcohol as shown by chemical analysis relates back to the time of 
the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption. This holding is in 
3 Idaho Rule of Evidence, ("IRE"), 401,402. See also Stutliff, at page 524, "The lapse of 
time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results 
and not to their admissibility." If evidence is relevant, the defendant has a due process 
right to present said evidence to the jury. See also RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
footnote, (supra). 
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accord those jurisdictions who have considered the question. Jackson v. 
City of Roanoke, -"-~-~" .:.....:...c------==~.:::-=-:..c, 1970); see also State v. Kohlasch, 
~~-,1--C~- _c.__~-=-='--=--''--"-'----'- (1972). contrary result could defeat the statute entirely 
since an extrapolation, particularly to a period prior to defendant's 'peak' period, would 
often be based solely on the defendant's own testimony as to the amount of alcohol 
ingested, the period of time over which it was ingested and the time of the last 
consumption of alcohol. Indeed, should the defendant feel that his blood alcohol level 
was lower at the time of the alleged offense, the statute specifically provides for 'the 
introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not 
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages.' LC. § 49-1102(b )4. 
This section entitles either party to produce a witness capable of extrapolating the results 
to a prior period of time. The burden, however, is on the party who seeks to introduce this 
evidence." (Stuttliff, p 525). 
Stutliff does not preclude a defendant from presenting evidence of BAC level at the 
time of driving; it places the burden on the party seeking to prove the matter. Further, the 
language, "We hold that this statute does not require extrapolation back but establishes 
that the percentage of blood alcohol as shown by chemical analysis relates back to the 
time of the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption", Sutliff, 
supra), is dispositive ohhis issue. A jury must consider all evidence that is admitted, and 
the rules of evidence do not distinguish between evidence from a witness on direct or cross 
examination. Idaho Rule of Evidence 401: "Relevant Evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Since the state has the burden of proof, the defendant need not put on any 
evidence. A defendant is allowed to make his/her entire case through cross-examination of 
the state's witnesses. The state elicited evidence of the BAC level, so the accuracy of the 
level is placed at issue. The state placed evidence in front of the jury about performance 
checks, LifeLoc maintenance, absorption in the body of alcohol, time frames between the 
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cessation of driving and the time of the BAC test, et al. Tomlinson should have been 
allowed to present evidence about all these issues cross-examination. 4 
In State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 867 P.2d 1006 
court held: 
App. 1994), 
"A defendant charged with driving under the influence by proof of excessive 
alcohol content is entitled to offer any competent evidence tending to impeach the results 
of the evidentiary tests admitted against him. See State v. Clark, 7 86 Or. 33,593 P.2d 
123, 128 (1979); State v. Gates, 7 Haw.App. 440, 777 P.2d 717, 720-21 (1989). Thus, a 
defendant may introduce evidence of his blood alcohol content, or other direct or 
circumstantial evidence, to show a disparity between such evidence and the results 
produced by the chemical testing, so as to give rise to an inference that the prosecution's 
test results were defective. See State v. Clark, 593 P.2d at 126-27; State v. Keller, 36 
Wash.App. 110,672 P.2d 412 (1983)." 
In this case, Tomlinson was precluded from introducing this evidence by the 
Court's erroneous rulings. 
In State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P .3d 436 (Idaho 2005), the court held: 
" We hold today that a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for 
driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation 
is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result 
back to the time of the alleged offense." 
A defendant is allowed to place the issue in front of the jury regardless of the 
state's decision to proceed on a per se basis. The extrapolation in Robinett, (supra), can 
be established by direct or cross-examination. 
Frederick testified he was familiar with the evidentiary concept of 
ascending/descending blood levels, (Tr p 97, 1-5). The state objected to this line of 
questioning, the jury was sent out, and the parties argued the issue. The state argues that 
4 IRE 611 (b Scope of cross-examination 
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Fredrick is not competent to testify ascending/descending BAC. Fredrick testified he 
was certified, a breath testing specialist, addition to a certified operator), on the 
LifeLoc, at least a hundred hours of training, six years of continuing education, DRE 
training, (Tr p 87, 113-13), had administered hundreds of the tests, (Tr p 33, 1110-25), and 
conducted approximately five hundred DUI investigations, (Tr p 28, 11 8-10). Tomlinson 
was not allowed to attempt to lay the foundation for Fredrick's competency even after 
Fredrick testified he was familiar with the ascending/descending BAC. 
Ascending/descending BAC is covered in POST training, and Fredrick testified 
knowledgeably for some three pages in the transcript about the pyloric valve and alcohol's 
journey through the body, (Tr p 89-92). 
The state cannot limit a defendant's ability to put on a defense by the manner in 
which it decides to charge a crime- impairment versus per se.5 The state objected to the 
defendant eliciting testimony about FST's, (Tr p 80, 1121-23). Tomlinson correctly argued 
that the state had "opened the door" to said testimony by the officer's testimony about the 
investigation, that the BAC at the time of driving, (forty-five minutes prior to the blow), was 
relevant, the defendant has a due process right to present a case, a relevant issue is whether 
the reading was accurate, further relevance lies in the fact the purported BAC readings were 
5 RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE: The constitutional right to present a 
complete and meaningful defense is grounded in the 6th Amendment Compulsory Process 
Clause or Confrontation Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, 
which includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, to cross-examine, and to present 
the defendant's version of the facts. The defendant argues that few rights are more 
fundamental than that of a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine a witness, and 
present evidence through cross-examination. Evidentiary rules cannot trump the right to 
present a defense, Lunbery v Hornbeak, 605 F. 3d 754 (9th Cir. 2010). 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL 9 of 13 
close to the legal limit, (.083, .082), and there is an acknowledged margin of error in the 
LifeLoc, (Tr p 81, 111-25, p 82, ll 1-15). 
This Court need not look any further than the DUI statute and DUI jury 
instruction to decide this issue. Idaho Code 18-8004 at (l)(a) reads as follows: "It is 
unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other 
intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in 
subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon 
a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.", 
(emphasis the author's). 
The jury instruction for DUI given in this case reads in pertinent part as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of Driving Under the Influence the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 26, 2012 
2. in the state if Idaho 
3. the defendant, Wade Tomlinson, drove 
4. a motor vehicle 
5. upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the 
public 
6. while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more as shown by analysis of the 
defendant's breath., (emphasis added). 
The verbiage in the statute and jury instruction define the offense, it is a violation 
of due process for Tomlinson not to be able to enter evidence challenging the elements of 
the crime for which he is charged. An appellate court may not change the plain meaning 
and verbiage in a statute by an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute. 
The state utilized Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 153 Idaho 200,280 P.3d 
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703 (Idaho 2012), ad nauseam in their district court brief for the proposition that a BAC 
over the limit at time of testing is dispositive of the issue. Elias was a civil case 
concerning an administrative license suspension. The burden proof is not beyond a 
reasonable doubt as in a criminal case. If the holding in Elias could be construed to apply 
to criminal prosecutions- which it cannot, then it needs to be overturned in the criminal 
context. Elias holds that, "There is no constitutional right to drive with alcohol in one's 
system." Tomlinson argues that there are statutes setting what this alcohol limit is- .08 or 
higher. "In essence, we held that the driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol 
in his blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was actually 
driving an hour earlier." This holding applied in a criminal action defies law and logic-
the statute is clear and unequivocal that the relevant BAC is while driving. The "took the 
risk" language in a criminal context is fallacious, a citizen is either in violation of the law 
or he is not, and due process requires notice of what said violation of the law is. In a 
criminal case, the state has the burden of proof, unlike in Elias when said burden was on 
the petitioner. 
Further, the requirements in a civil hearing under IC 18-8002A(7) are inadequate 
when considered in the light of due process protections in a criminal DUI case: 1- the 
burden of proof is on the party requesting the administrative hearing; 2- the standard is 
preponderance of the evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt; 3- the finds of facts and 
"law" by the hearing officer are, "independent of the determination of the same or similar 
facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence; 4-
the losing party can seek judicial review in the manner provided for judicial review of 
final agency actions." Id. 
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Overly simplified dispositive of the issue state opting to prosecute under 
"per se" of DUI is the fundamental right to procedural due process oflaw. 
defendant charged by the state has the absolute right to relevant evidence at jury 
trial. Once again, relevant evidence can be from a defense expert, or by way of cross-
examination of state's witnesses. As long as the proposed evidence has any tendency to 
make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. Tomlinson's BAC at the time he ceased driving is this type of 
evidence. Any and all evidence concerning BAC at the time of the seizure, 
ascending/descending BAC, margin of error on the breathalyzer, performance on FSTs, et 
al, should have been allowed to be presented to the jury in a full and complete manner. 
The chief example of Tomlinson being precluded from eliciting relevant evidence 
due to erroneous rulings by the Court is seen when the Court sustained the state's 
objection to cross-examination evidence about the extent of the defendant's impairment, 
results of FST's, (Tr p 856, 1112-25, p 86, 111-7). 
The state entered the BAC printout into evidence over Tomlinson's objection, (Tr p 
61, 111-25). Tomlinson objected as the BAC is a police report prohibited under IRE 
803(6)(A), the state responded the report was allowed in under the statute. The Judge 
erroneously ruled that the printout came in. The rule and statute are in conflict, when a 
conflict exists between a rule and statute, the rule controls, (Tr p 61, 11 18-24) The jury 
should not have had the BAC readout in the jury room .. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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be vacated, and case remanded for 
a new trial. The defendant should receive his due process right to be heard on the issue of 
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